

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: MEETING OF WORKING GROUP II,
OCTOBER 13, 1975 - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 46

1. SUMMARY. WORKING GROUP II MET 3:00 PM OCTOBER 13. US PRESENTED ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED CHANGES TO US DRAFT PROTOCOLS. US THEN PRESSED SOVIETS THROUGH SERIES OF QUESTIONS TO EXPLAIN IN SPECIFIC DETAIL BASIS FOR THEIR CONCERN THAT DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WOULD INTERFERE WITH PNE PROJECTS AND GAIN INFORMATION NOT NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION. SOVIET SIDE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON US DRAFT IN SPECIFIC DETAIL. SAFRONOV SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY US OBJECTED TO SOVIET APPROACH ON OWNERSHIP OF SLIFER, BUT HE WOULD NOT EXPLAIN BASIS FOR SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT US APPROACH. SAFRONOV CLAIMED UNDER US PROVISIONS IN PROTOCOL I DESIGNATED PERSONNEL COULD GAIN INFORMATION ON EXPLOSIVE. SAFRONOV SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP EXPLOSIVE OUTSIDE AREA OF OBSERVER ACCESS. SAFRONOV SAID, UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, DESIGNATED PERSONNEL COULD GAIN INFORMATION ON INSTALLATIONS NOT RELATED TO PNE BUT LOCATED IN GENERAL AREA OF PNE SITE. SAFRONOV SAID FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WAS OWNERSHIP OF VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT. SOVIET SIDE SAID THERE WAS NO POINT TO DISCUSS US DRAFT; THEIR POSITION OF PRINCIPLE DICTATED THEIR RESPONSE IN EVERY DETAIL. IT WAS AGREED TO SEEK GUIDANCE FROM HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. END SUMMARY.

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2. US SIDE STATED THEY SOUGHT TO HAVE SOVIET SIDE POINT OUT IN SPECIFIC DETAIL HOW PROVISIONS IN US DRAFT PROTOCOLS WOULD LEAD TO INTERFERENCE WITH PNE PROJECT OR TO ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION AS ASSERTED BY SOVIETS. IT WAS UNDERSTANDING OF US SIDE THAT HEAD OS DELEGATION HAD AGREED SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO SO. US SIDE STATED THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT AS BASIS OF AGREEMENT SOVIET POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE THAT VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE OWNED AND OPERATED BY HOST PARTY, OR SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW PROHIBITION AGAINST PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS OR THEIR EQUIPMENT.

3. US SIDE HANDED OVER TO SOVIET SIDE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED CHANGES TO PROTOCOLS I AND II (SEE PARA 14.)

4. US SIDE THEN WENT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH THROUGH ARTICLE CONCERNING OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS IN PROTOCOL I AND ASKED SOVET SIDE HOW PROVISIONS WOULD INTERFERE WITH PNE PROJECTS OR LEAD TO ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION.

5. SOVIET SIDE DID NOT RESPOND TO QUESTIONS BUT ASKED QUESTIONS OF ITS OWN. US PRESSED SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS. SAFRONOV THEN ADDRESSED SLIFERS, SAYING THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY US OBJECTED TO RELIANCE ON EQUIPMENT OF HOST PARTY. HE DID NOT ADDRESS BASIS FOR SOVIET CONCERN. ONLY OBJECTION HE OFFERED TO US POSITION WAS THAT IT INVOLVED BOTH OF VERIFYING SIDE TO BRING SUCH EQUIPMENT.

6 US SIDE RESPONDED THAT ONLY THROUGH USE OF EQUIPMENT OF VERIFYING SIDE COULD VERIFYING SIDE FORM INDEPENDENT JUDGEMENT ON ACTUAL YIELD.

7. SAFRONOV THEN DEALT WITH ISSUE OF UNRESTRICTED ACCESS AS CALLED FOR IN US PROTOCOL. HE CONTENDED THAT US PROVISION COULD BE UTILIZED BY VERIFYING SIDE, IF IT WANTED TO, TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE EXPLOSIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIETS WOULD FIND IT NECESSARY FOLLOWING US PROPOSALS, TO KEEP THE EXPLOSIVE OUT OF ZONE OF 10 KILOMETER RADIUS. US SIDE DISPUTED SOVIET CONTENTION THAT SUCH INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED,

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BUT SAFRONOV DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.

8. WITH RESPECT TO ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION NOT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION, SAFRONOV SAID DESIGNATED PERSONNEL COULD USE THEIR EQUIPMENT TO GET INFORMATION ON INSTALLATIONS NOT RELATED TO PNE PROJECT; WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF 10 KILOMETER RADIUS ZONE. THOUGH VAGUELY STATED, THIS CONCERN SEEMED TO BE WITH INTERCEPTION OF "RADIO

WAVES" BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL.

9. SAFRONOV SAID SOVIET APPROACH SOLVES PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY US POSITION. FURTHERMORE, DETAIL IN US DRAFT GAVE APPEARANCE OF MISTRUST. HENCE, SOVIET FORMULATIONS AND EMPHASIS ON COOPERATION.

10. US SIDE RESPONDED THAT SOVIET DRAFT DID NOT SOLVE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. DETAIL IS NECESSARY PRECISELY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, WHICH COULD LEAD TO MISTRUST.

11. SAFRONOV SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN DEALING WITH US DRAFT IN DETAIL; POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED SOVIET RESPONSE. HE STATED WITH EMPHASIS THAT OWNERSHIP OF VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT WAS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION, AND IMPLIED THAT SOLUTION OF THIS COULD SOLVE PROBLEM OF ACCESS BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL.

12. US REITERATED NEED TO DEAL IN DETAIL WITH QUESTIONS POSED BY US DRAFT, AND INADEQUACY OF SOVIET DRAFT AS IT RELATED TO OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.

13. IT WAS AGREED TO ASK HEADS OF DELEGATIONS FOR GUIDANCE.

14. FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF THE SUGGESTED CHANGES TO DRAFT TREATY AND PROTOCOLS WHICH WERE HANDED TO SOVIET SIDE AT TODAY'S WORKING GROUP MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

21. PROTOCOL I, ARTICLE VI, INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE:
DELETE "IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF INFORMATION
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PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES II AND IV".

22. PROTOCOL I, ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH 4: AMEND
FIRST SENTENCE TO READ "DESIGNATED PERSONNEL SHALL NOT HAVE TO SEEK ACCESS BY PHYSICAL, VISUAL, OR TECHNICAL MEANS TO THE INTERIOR OF THE CANISTER CONTAINING AN EXPLOSIVE, DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER INFORMATION DESCRIPTIVE OF DESIGN OF AN EXPLOSIVE, NOR TO EQUIPMENT FOR CONTROL AND FIRING OF EXPLOSIVES".

23. PROTOCOL I, ARTICLE XIII, PARAGRAPH 2: AMEND
TO READ "THE HOST PARTY SHALL DEFEND, INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS THE OTHER PARTY AGAINST ANY AND ALL ACTIONS, CLAIMS AND DEMANDS FOR LOSS, DAMAGE, PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH, EXCEPT LOSS, DAMAGE, PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH SUSTAINED

BY ANY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, ARISING OUT OF THE CONDUCT OF EXPLOSIONS."

24. PROTOCOL II, ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 4, SUBPARAGRAPHS (B) AND (C): AMEND TO READ:

"(B) NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS BEFORE THE EVENT, THE HOST PARTY SHALL INFORM THE OTHER PARTY OF THE EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION OF THE EQUIPMENT TO BE USED FOR THE EMPLACEMENT OF EACH EXPLOSIVE AND OF THE EQUIPMENT TO WHICH THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3 WILL BE ATTACHED, AND IF THE LENGTH OF THE CANISTER IS 30 METERS OR MORE, OF THE EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION AND DIMENSIONS OF THE CANISTER WHICH WILL CONTAIN EACH EXPLOSIVE AND WILL BE USED TO PLACE THE EXPLOSIVE INTO ITS EMPLACEMENT HOLE;

(C) NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS BEFORE THE EVENT, THE HOST PARTY SHALL PROMMIDE TO THE OTHER PARTY A DESCRIPTION OF MATERIALS, INCLUDING THEIR DENSITIES, TO BE USED TO STEM EACH EMPLACEMENT HOLE;"

25. PROTOCOL II ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 5: DELETE THE WORD "PRINTED".
END TEXT.

15. REF STATE 241383 PARA 10. CLEAR PRINT OF SOVIET DRAFT SENT AIRGRAM NO. A-363.
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16. REF STATE 241383 PARA 13. PNE MESSAGE NO. 25 CONTAINED DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PNE AIRGRAMS NOS. 352 AND 353. IT IS UNCLASSIFIED MOSCOW MESSAGE 14023, DATED OCTOBER 2, 1975.

17. REF STATE 220610 PARA 1. CORRECT READING IS "MOSCOW 13216 PARA 8 CORRECTION TO MOSCOW 13020 PARA 13; ARTICLE VI SUBPARA 3(D) AND SUBPARA 3(F) SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ARTICLE VI SUBPARA (D) AND SUBPARA (F)." STOESEL

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